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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal from a final order of the district court 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
In its statement of the issue, Appellant fails to include the fact that Appellant had 
not established a right to intervene and that the underlying dispute was between the only 
parties with a direct relation to the transaction at issue. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provision is provided in Appellant's brief: Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 24(a) (Intervention of Right). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 9, 2011, Appellee Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard & Moss, LLC 
("PADRM") filed the action styled PADRM v. Nelson, et al, Case No. 110903223, 
Judge Iwasaki. R. 1-29. The Complaint generally pertains to collecting on legal fees 
owed by PADRM's former client. See id. The Complaint also raises the issue of 
remedies available to PADRM including the enforcement of a consensual lien and a non-
consensual attorneys' lien in the matters that PADRM provided legal services for. See id. 
As a part of enforcing the attorneys' liens, PADRM included parties who are interest 
holders of record under available UCC-1 searches, including non-clients Screen Actors 
1 
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Guild, Inc., Directors Guild of America, Inc., and Laurence Ross ("Non-Clients") so that 
the trial court could assess the rights and priorities of all parties' interests. See id. 
Two days after filing the Complaint, on February 11, 2011, some of the client 
Defendants, including Shannon's Rainbow, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, 
Shannon's Rainbow, LLC a Delaware limited liability company, and Shannon's Rainbow 
Production, LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability company (collectively, "Shannon's 
Rainbow Entities") filed a substantially similar declaratory judgment action styled 
Shannon's Rainbow, LLC et al. v. PADRM, Case No. 110903542 ("Second Action"). 
See R. 37 - 41. The Second Action was caused to be filed by other Defendants in this 
action who are managers and/or members of the Shannon's Rainbow Entities, including 
Kelly Nelson, Charles Morrison, Frank Johnson, Larry Richert, and John Mowod 
(collectively, the "Shannon's Rainbow Persons"). See id. 
The Second Action disputes PADRM's consensual and non-consensual liens.. See 
id. Concurrently filed with the Second Action was a Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order and Preliminary Injunction to prevent foreclosure of the lien rights. R. 296 - 302. 
The Temporary Restraining Order was granted the same day (February 11, 2011) and a 
preliminary injunction hearing was set for February 23, 2011 at 3:00 P.M. ("Hearing"). 
Id. Prior to the Hearing, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion for Continuance of the 
Preliminary Injunction and Extension of the Temporary Restraining Order because the 
parties were in active settlement negotiations. Id. 
On February 23, 2011, a third party Appellant in this matter, Supernova Media, 
Inc., et al ("Supernova"), filed a Motion to Intervene in the Second Action. Id. 
2 
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Supernova's Motion to Intervene in the Second Action was substantially similar to its 
Motion to Intervene in this Original Action. Id. Supernova is a non-party that has been 
adverse to the Shannon's Rainbow Entities and the Shannon's Rainbow Persons, as well 
as their former counsel (PADRM) since 2008. Supernova claims to have a controlling 
management interest in the Shannon's Rainbow Entities that have been suing it. It is on 
this basis that Supernova seeks to intervene in both actions. 
On February 24, 2011, the parties filed a Stipulated Motion to Seal the Preliminary 
Injunction hearing in the Second Action, in light of the fact that the dispute centers on 
evidence that is protected under the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. 
See id. In point of fact Appellant is seeking to discover litigation strategy that has been, 
and continues to be, used against it. The parties in the Second Action were successful in 
reaching settlement and codified the same in a confidential settlement agreement. See id. 
The parties also agreed to a Stipulated form to Dismiss with Prejudice not only the 
Second Action, but also the original Action. See id. Notably, there were no proceedings 
other than filing the Complaint. The TRO was filed in the Second Action only. 
Supernova has been attempting to stop the effectuation of the settlement between 
PADRM and its former clients and dismissal of the cases. 
The parties to the Second Action rescheduled the Preliminary 
Injunction/Intervention hearing for Monday, March 21, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. because of 
efforts to settle the case. See id. During the March 21, 2011 hearing, Judge Hilder heard 
representations by the parties that they had settled their dispute and were prepared to 
dismiss both the Second Action and the Original Action with prejudice. See id. The 
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Court also heard argument on Supernova's Motion to Intervene, but did not grant the 
Motion to Intervene. See id. Instead, the Court scheduled a follow-up hearing for 
Monday, March 28, 2011, at 4:00 P.M. to hear argument on the settlement of the parties 
and the proposed intervenor's Motion to Intervene. See id 
On March 21,2011, PADRM filed a truncated Opposition to the Motion to 
Intervene. See id. The Opposition was "truncated" because the briefing schedule was 
ambiguous in light of the stay and Rule 7 as to when the opposition was in fact due. See 
id 
On March 25, 2011, the parties (PADRM, Shannon's Rainbow Entities, and 
Shannon's Rainbow Persons) filed a Joint Supplemental Opposition to the Motion to 
Intervene as Moot in light of the parties' settlement and agreement to dismiss the Actions 
with prejudice. See id. Also on March 25,2011, Supernova filed a Reply to the Joint 
Opposition to the Motion to Intervene. On March 28, 2011, PADRM filed a Sur-Reply to 
the Reply. See id. 
Having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties both for and against 
Supernova's Motion to Intervene in the Second Action, and being fully briefed of the I 
issues pertaining thereto, Judge Hilder entered an order dismissing Supernova's Motion 
to Intervene: "[T]he Court found that the Intervenors had not shown, as required under 
i 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that they claimed an interest relating to 
the property or transaction which is the subject of this action.. . Accordingly, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Intervenor's Motion to Intervene as of Right shall be, and hereby is, 
A * 
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DENIED." See id Thus, two separate District Court judges reviewed the relevant filings 
and independently held that Appellant's Motion to Intervene should be denied. 
Indeed, the settlement between PADRM, the Shannon's Rainbow Entities, and the 
Shannon's Rainbow Persons (the "Original Parties") resolved the issue raised in the 
Original Action, namely the collection of PADRM's legal fees and the foreclosure of its 
attorneys' lien as against the Shannon's Rainbow Entities and the Shannon's Rainbow 
Persons (collectively the "Shannon's Rainbow Defendants"). The declaratory judgment 
claim was made to prioritize the rights of other secured creditors with UCC-1 filings of 
record, namely the Screen Actors Guild, the Directors' Guild, and Laurence Ross. Now 
that PADRM has settled with the Shannon's Rainbow Defendants regarding the fee 
dispute, the declaratory aspect of this case is moot, because PADRM released its claim to 
any lien or security interest. 
Because the parties have settled, a justiciable controversy no longer exists 
regarding the Original Parties. The trial court's dismissal of the case in its early stages 
where none of the Defendants made an appearance or filed an Answer is completely 
within the power and discretion of the trial court. In light of the settlement and stipulated 
orders, Supernova's Motion to Intervene in the Original Action is obviated, and further 
action by the trial court or by this Court is unwarranted. 
Subsequent to the trial court's dismissal of this Original Action, Appellant 
Supernova filed the instant appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant seeks intervention based on issues that are irrelevant to the present 
matter. Indeed, each and every one of the facts listed by Appellant in its Motion to 
Intervene is copied verbatim out of the many pleadings in six separate federal actions in 
Utah and New York (the "Other Actions")1. Appellant should, and does, have the right 
1
 Supernova Media, Inc., individually and on behalf of Shannon's Rainbow LLC 
(Delaware), Shannon's Rainbow LLC (Utah), Joycelyn Engle, Julianne Michelle v. 
Shannon's Rainbow LLC (Delaware), Shannon's Rainbow, LLC (Utah), SummitWorks, 
LLC, Frank E. Johnson, Kelly Nelson, Charles Morrison, Carmine Lotito, John Mowod, 
Lawarence Richert, Case No. 650264/2011 (the "Third New York Action") (pending); 
DiPalma, Shannon's Rainbow, LLC (Delaware), Shannon's Rainbow, LLC (Utah) v. 
Shannon's Rainbow, LLC (Utah), SummitWorks, LLC, Johnson, Nelson, Morrison, 
Lotito (Case No. 102253/2010) ("Second New York Action") (pending); Shannon's 
Rainbow, LLC, (Delaware), Shannon's Rainbow, LLC (Utah), Shannon's Rainbow 
Production, LLC (Pennsylvania) v. Supernova Media, Inc., Joycelyn Engle, Julianne 
Michelle (Case No. 110902679, J. Hilder) (pending); JOSEPH DIPALMA, suing 
individually and in the right of SHANNON'S RAINBOW LLC, a Delaware Limited 
Liability Company and SHANNON'S RAINBOW LLC, a Utah Limited Liability 
Company, Plaintiff, v. SUMMITWORKS, LLC, FRANK E. JOHNSON, KELLY 
NELSON, CHARLES MORRISON, CARMINE "TONY" LOTITO, SHANNON'S 
RAINBOW, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company and SHANNON'S 
RAINBOW LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, Defendants. (Case No. 
N.Y. 102253/2010) ("Second New York Action") (pending); Pia v. Supernova Media, 
Inc., Joycelyn Engle, Joseph DiPalma, Julianne Michelle, Kelly Kent (Case No. 2:09-cv-
00840CW) ("pending"); SHANNON'S RAINBOW, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company; SHANNON'S RAINBOW, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, 
SHANNON'S RAINBOW PRODUCTION, a Pennsylvania limited liability 
company, Plaintiffs, v. SUPERNOVA MEDIA, Inc. a New York corporation; 
JOYCELYN ENGLE a/k/a JOYCELYN DIPALMA, an individual; JULIANNE 
MICHELLE, an individual, and Does 1-100. (Case No. 2:08-cv-00880-TS); 
SUPERNOVA MEDIA, LLC, on behalf of SHANNON'S RAINBOW LLC, a Delaware 
Limited Liability Company, JOSEPH DI PALMA, and JOYCELYN ENGLE, Plaintiffs, 
v. SHANNON'S RAINBOW LLC, et al. Defendants. (Case No. 09 Civ 3820, J. Jones) 
("First New York Action") (dismissed); SHANNON'S RAINBOW, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; SHANNON'S RAINBOW, LLC, a Delaware limited liability 
company, SHANNON'S RAINBOW PRODUCTION, a Pennsylvania limited liability 
company, Plaintiffs, v. SUPERNOVA MEDIA, Inc. a New York corporation; 
£ 
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In .vu.l ailitiilic.iliujt ml its riyhts and interests in the Other Actions. This collection 
action, however, is simply no! the proper forum to address said issues. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err b) • dismissing the case becai lse the 
settlement ol tin Ice dispute bilvnvn llin" Appellees eliminated the only justiciable • • 
conlmvrrsv sit issue, obviating intervention by a third-party, 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT S UNPRUVL.N ^ ,\... . . ! . . . : • • ^. -. V ^ S T THE INTERVENTION 
F F O T ' I F F M F N T S O^P ' 1 ' - ^-1/ A ; 
] ' * viii^ ii ct third party establishes its standing to become a 
party in a suit. In re Ell, i37 P.3d 809, 820 (Utah 2006). "'I o justily mten enuuiu (I i: 
party seeking intervention must demonstrate a direei iwaesi in ilr smhjeet inkier oi tuv, 
ntigau-. * ,. • be affected, for good or for ill." Id. (citing 
• Cliamoe,*, 657P.2u279, 282 (Utah HRIVj ^ *- eurK have indicate : ".' 
"Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civ.! rm^Uure, w.i.i -. •. 
lighi, uescuix,
 3 i,.~ ^ ; , h ^ . \ ^ bldiub oi circumstances 
liriiiil ilu; liivvsuil in older In justify intervention, stating: 
[T]he applicant |mu ->: j claim[] an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of ihe action and [be] so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical, matter impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest , , 
Id I riling I ftab R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (2006)) (emphasis added). The intervenor must 
rsUbtish an interest that is ""direct, substantial, and legally protect,* 
JOYCELYN ENGLE a/k/a JOYCELYN DIP ALMA, an individual; JULIAN"^-
MICHELLE, an individual, and Does 1400. (Case No. 2:08-cv-00880-TS) 
("dismissed"). The forgoing actions are referred to herein as the "Other Actions." 
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County v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying Utah law) 
(emphasis added); Vermejo Park Corp. v. Kaiser Coal Corp., 998 F.2d 783, 791 (10th 
Cir. 1993) ("[Intervention requires that this interest in the proceedings be direct, 
substantial, and legally protectable."); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 
(1971) (stating that such an interest must be "significantly protectable"). Moreover, "In 
order to intervene as a matter of right the intervening party must have an interest relating 
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action." In re Environmental Elec. 
Sys., Inc., 11 B.R. 962, 964 (N.D.Ga. 1981) (cited by the 10th Circuit in Vermejo Park 
Corp, 998 F.2d, at 791) (emphasis added). 
Making the required determination of Appellant's alleged interests and whether 
those interests are related to the attorneys' fee dispute will necessitate an effectual ruling 
on the merits of central issues that are pending in three separate actions in Utah and New 
York. The reason is that Appellant's alleged interests all depend upon the allegation that 
Appellant is a controlling manager of the Shannon's Rainbow Entities. In essence, 
Appellant's Motion to Intervene attempts to put the trial court in a position where it may 
have had to trump the analysis of several other jurisdictions on this issue just to < 
determine whether Appellant could intervene in the first place. 
A. To Determine Whether Appellant has a "Legally Protectable" Interest 
in this Attorneys9 Fee Dispute Will Require A Monumental * 
Undertaking that is Presently the Subject of Three Litigation Matters 
in Utah and New York, 
Supernova must establish a "substantial/' "direct" and "legally protectable" 
I 
interest in the subject matter of this suit (fee dispute) that will be impaired if it is not 
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ullii" nil H mfen in Snpi\i \ l |lie mere existence of a third person's comii\ 
interest in the outcome of pending litigation is insufficient to warrant intervene \ of 
right," Vermejo Park Corp. v. Kaisit * —< i >, 
therefore eonie; i :ts no surprisi ; thai, ilie snffiriencv of an applicant's interesi & a highly 
f.- * - :eeitlc determination." San Juan County v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1207 
(10 ! Cir. 2005) (applying Utah law). 
Appellant conlronlul line It mi a mi m iiilii nine nionnmentiil task of determining 
whefhei II has .i m.ijoril) oi ujnlrollin^ interest in the film "Shannon's Rainbow" and (lie 
companies that produced it, so that it can gain traction, in this fee dispute between 
Defendants and their law firm,,, of over 2 and lA years, i me niato i nanus and issues rinsed 
,-; L\!LIHI)1\I \\ \\\\\\ iimilii >1 i^nos raised 111 the Other Actions, and do not 
mv bearins on the attorneys5 fee dispute addressed in this action. Appellant does 
not ha\ <„ ar interest in whether the Defendant paid its attorneys' fees. Nor does 
Appellant have any interest MY cluim as lo whether Ihe II rm enn Inreelose on il > 
attorneys' lien leonsetisual nr non-consensual). ' ' ' • 
Appellant asserts that it has a right in the film "Shannon's Rainbow" and in the 
Defendant entities that produced the iilm., inelndriijj, iiiiinagei lal and men " - s. 
However, (he present dispute is unrelated to those issues. If Appellant has an issue 
regarding its membership or management rights, it can (and has) addressed those 
concerns in the Other Actions. 
Tn orde to deleiiniite whether A|ipdLuil litis it"' eabJanliar interest permitting 
intervention, the Court would need to at a minimum make factual findings as to: 
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• Whether and to what extent Appellant invested in entities that produced the 
film "Shannon's Rainbow." (See Motion to Intervene, Background Facts, f 
1.) 
• Whether Appellant is an equal co-manager with SummitWorks, LLC. (Id., 
at H 2.) 
• Whether SummitWorks, LLC fell short of its investment obligations. (Id., 
at 14.) 
Whether Appellant has distribution rights in the film. (Id., at \ 5.) 
• Whether Apellant obtained a 51% ownership interest in the film. (Id., at ^  
6.) 
• Whether Joseph Pia represented SummitWorks, LLC. (Id., at f 10.) 
• Whether Mr. Pia encouraged some of the Defendant entities to bring suit 
against Appellant and Joycelyn Engle. (Id., at \ 12.) 
• Whether SummitWorks improperly arrogated the names of the Defendant 
entities to bring suit against Appellant, Joycelyn Engle, and others. (Id., at 
m i3.) 
These issues are not relevant to the present case by any stretch of the imagination. 
Furthermore, each one of these issues is central in the Other Actions. That Appellant is 
even raising these issues illustrates its purpose to clutter yet another legal proceeding 
with the same facts, claims, and issues already being dealt with in the Other Actions. A ^ 
cursory review of the Complaint in the Original Action attests to this fact. 
To make a determination on the forgoing issues and conclude what, if any interest, 
Appellant has, the Court will need to permit discovery and depositions and hold an 
evidentiary hearing to weigh the evidence. However, the trial court is not required to 
make said inquiry to deny Appellant's Motion to Intervene. PADRM was legal counsel i 
for the Shannon's Rainbow Entities against Appellant. Appellant complains that it was 
-t s\ 
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sued, and states that it never should have been sued because * . r rN !f\id ^ ~^~ Whether or 
not there is any validity to this claim has no relevancy w ie present 
Accordingly, Appellant s Moluu In Intervene was propi. 111 denial, 
l Threat of Inconsistent Judgments is Too Great to Permit Intervention. 
Appellant should, and does, ha\e the right to seek adjudication ol'iu n .. . * a-
interests in the Other Action • i u-.> iu, u^p^c is c..:\h, •* ~ ^.i *• 
the man iss^ .-..•• idication of the issues aUirou^u:^ 
PADR1V s attorneys' liens as well as Shannon's Rainbow's request for declaratory relief 
has absolutely nothing to do with Appellant or the many claims it has asserted in the 
Other Actio ..j » ose issue:. . a mil IK fore the D^lriv I 11inul m the fee dispute, TIIUL'C 
inconsistent and contrary results should the District Court 
undertake the daunting task of adjudicating Appellant's purported rights. 
The Tenth Circuit admonishes that "|t|hc siniidl.tiiOiiiis pioseeuliuii in I 
different couri'i ul eases relating to (he s.ime parties and issues leads to the wastefulness 
ol lime energy and money." Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 348 F.2d 689, 6^2 (10th Cir, 
1.965) (internal quotation marks omitted). Permitting the hrst-tiled action to ddenrinie 
the merits of the ease ' protects parties from the considerable expense and potential for 
inconsistent judgments that duplicate litigation entails." Id. at 335-336. 
Appellant can poinJ U* no valid reason why the parties should be forced LO lilii'iiie 
the same claims, at the sai. i.. oiue. :H ^ ; ^ I . . . u • r«-'e different courts o whs '• \: 
< Hl l i i e i ' f V t t i u . i l < s •- > • ::'ici wiiu'* or partially), which would result if 
the District Court is required to determine the validity of Appellant's "legally 
1 1 
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protectable" interest. For these reasons, Appellant's Motion to Intervene was properly 
denied. 
II. BECAUSE THE PARTIES HAVE SETTLED AND FILED MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH 
PREJUDICE, APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTERVENE IS OBVIATED. 
As a general rule, "(a) prerequisite of an intervention (which is an ancillary 
proceeding in an already instituted suit) is an existing suit within the Court's 
jurisdiction." Non-Commissioned Officers Association of the United States v. Army Times 
Publishing Co., 637 F.2d 372, 373 (5th Cir. 1981); see McClune v. Shamah, 593 F.2d 482 
(3d Cir. 1979), U.S. Postal Service v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1978); Black v. 
Central Motor Lines, Inc., 500 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1974); see also 7A, Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil s 1917 (1972). Appellant's "ancillary" motion to 
intervene requires the existence of a suit within the Court's jurisdiction. This action has 
been settled, and the parties jointly filed a stipulated order to dismiss with prejudice, prior 
to an answer being filed, and prior to any other substantive proceeding. 
"A settlement of all claims among all parties removes the necessary element of 
adversariness and moots the action." 13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, § 3533.2, at 
236; Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 597-598 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
plaintiffs individual claim was mooted when the defendant offered to satisfy his entire 
demand; there was "no dispute over which to litigate," because the plaintiff "has no 
remaining stake"). Moreover, an "argument [of] sunk costs does not license courts to 
retain jurisdiction over cases in which one or both of the parties plainly lacks a 
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conl nuiing inkivst, as when the parties have souk, friends of me Earth Inc. i > 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC T> ,\ r O Q T T ^. 1^7. ^ . , 
Mootness has Ixei,
 4* ..-:.. ^ p u ~ ^ : . - \ settlement was 
made b\ a |i.ut1) Int. king nullinrih In srtllr {("hemical Waste Management, Inc. i \ 
Broadwater, 75o I-.2d 1538 ( l id: L"^ . 1985)), unfti^v induced (Ringgold v P c 5 
F.2c3 30^ (2c Ci- *<)77Vk coerced (In re ofKingsley, 802 
C M^M.y, O I . . . . .
 J . ; . f : . . . J • ^ ^ •';« ' J" ' ^ O r ^ ' V ^ ^ t / c 
M.-^v - ."- - - ' ' \
 ;3541\Ju 124o? I2^y viLLhCir.2()()4j^/K;/m(g Wrigl^, 
Miller & Cooper). Nevertheless, once a case has been settled, it is over and a would-be 
intervenor has no action in whic • • , . 
r
 .. , . . • •- " -
1
 -settled principle that the law generally 
favors the encouragement of settlements." Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n v. 
Am Airlines, Inc., 573 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that il i , i lean IK Ik 
express intent |nl congress| In eneoiiiage seltleitKiif1)1 S<><> FlavUht Trailer & Equipment 
""
 s
 ' un V.H. x9fco) (stating "[t]his is a recognition : Un 
policy cfth;! ^\ general 1\ : eneouragi settlements."); Qpna/7 v (ji,:..n <.,<. « . i: 
Associates, supra _ < ..i.App.ia. , . * • W », ,>6() r'al.Rjy -xUYu 
w i/lll -eslablishul policy filial settlements of litigation are favored and should be 
encouraged.... It would be a sad day indeed if a litigant and his or her attorney could not 
dismiss an action to avoid further lees and costs ' l 
ias prevuu -. M, 
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[T]he law favors the settlement of disputes. See In re E.H., 2004 UT App 
419,112, 103 P.3d 177 (citingMascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 
1987)). It is indeed chilling to imagine the conditions that would exist 
within the judicial branch of government and society as a whole were 
settlements to be treated with hostility.... We are at a loss, however, to 
imagine why a court would insist on a process that preserves adversarial 
purity for its own sake. 
In re EH., 137 P.3d 809, 814 (Utah 2006). 
The issues in this case are resolved. The parties should be permitted to move on to 
the other pending cases where the substance of Appellant's claims is being addressed. 
Intervention should be denied. 
A. The Settlement Cannot Be Interfered with By Non-Party Appellant 
In the Tenth Circuit case of San Juan Valley, Utah v. U.S., 503 F.3d 1163 (10th 
Cir. 2007), the court held that a third-party intervenor cannot interfere with a private 
settlement. San Juan Valley, 503 F.3d at 1173 (citing Local No. 93, Int'lAss'n of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528-29 (1986) ("It has never been 
supposed that one party-whether an original party, a party that was joined later, or 
an intervenor-could preclude other parties from settling their own disputes . . . " ) ; 
citing Johnson v. Lodge # 93 of the Fraternal Order of Police, 393 F. 3d 1096, 1106 (10th 
Cir. 2004)). 
In San Juan Valley, the court acknowledged that the intervenor had claims and 
alleged interests, but commended the intervenor to address those in other proceedings (an 
amicus brief). Id. Appellant can fully vet its claims in the three pending cases in Utah 
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and New York, I )ismissal of Ilir iri.il court case and a denial of Appellant's V 
Intervene will not wreak any prejudice on Appellant. 
Even in a class action—which unlike this case does requne settlement uppmviil -
courts have rejected alleinpls b\ iiiln'vrnors In denmnd ;i determination on the merits 
ones,: settlement has been reached. In Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, the 
APFA filed a motion to intervene and requested a hearing on its objections lo line 
parties' settlement agreemen 3./;;,/. ^:. • . - •-- ,m. Airlines, 
i . _. ourt found thai ioi a co:;;pleic resolution ofthe 
issues that arise out of this proposed settlement, that the APFA should have a voice 
concerning i f and therefore granted the motion to intervene iimi \ 'inducted a firarha, * n 
the issues raised, 
A fU1!* \W intervenor's argument, the appellate court upheld the settlement 
agreement, reasoning that "the equities are on the side of approving the settleiiietil 
agreement." Id, at 962 -• 3. i lie intervenor appealed, m^uuy llim IIU- merits (if the case 
iLscll', as well .is Hi iiitenvii M \ ilainns needed to be litigated prior to approval ofthe 
settlement. Id. at 963. The appellate court disagreed with the intervenor and affirmed 
approval of the settlement: 
While
 w e believe that. , . the issues raised by intervenor would be both difficult 
and interesting, we must recognize that we are here reviewing the propriety of a 
settlement and not a judgment rendered after trial. We believe that the issues 
raised by the intervenor should not be decided on the [merits], but rather must be 
decided on the basis of legal principles regulating judicial review of settlement 
agreements. Relying on those principles, we conclude that the district court 
correctly declined to decide those issues relevant to the merits ofthe plaintiffs' 
claims prior to deciding merely whether the settlement agreement was appropriate. 
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Id. at 963 - 4 (emphasis added). 
As much as Appellant may wish to interfere with Appellees' private settlement 
and use this case as a channel to obtain discovery, the settlement and interest of the 
parties to move on should be dispositive. No further analysis is needed. 
B. The Court Does Not Need to Approve the Original Parties' Voluntary 
Settlement Agreement 
"Ordinarily, settlement agreements need not be approved by the court." TBG Inc., 
v. Bendis, 811 F.Supp. 596, 600 (D. Kansas 2992) (citing In re Masters Mates & Pilots 
Pension Plan and IMP Litigation, 957 F.2d 1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Typically, 
settlement rests solely in the discretion of the parties, and the judicial system plays no 
role.")). This suit is not one of the very limited cases where a court must approve a 
settlement, such as a class action or a bankruptcy proceeding. However, even in class 
actions, courts have recognized that 
[t]he Court's exercise of discretion in this regard should be informed by the strong 
judicial policy favoring settlement as well as by the realization that compromise is 
the essence of settlement.... Litigants should be encouraged to determine their 
respective rights between themselves." 
Perez v. Ausurion Corp., et al 501 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (internal i 
citations omitted). 
The settlement agreement in this case resolves all of the named parties, without 
i 
prejudice to any of Appellant's claims, and did not need to be approved by the trial court. 
C. Appellant Misapplies the Millard Standard to this Case. 
Appellant believes that by merely couching its motion to intervene "as of right" that 
the settlement and mutual agreement of Appellees as the only parties to this litigation to 
16 
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dismiss 'the suit with prejudice, does n< )t obviate its motic >n. Appellant's misapplication 
and improper extension of Millard, a case tn.u c . 
commission pintecding, din1 noi eiu1 appellant w rij.'Jn where none exists. Millard 
County v, Utah State Cornm'n ex rel Intermotmtain Power Agency, 823 P.2d 459 (Utah 
1991), 
1 ' . . , . , . . ' : 
< • i •« li*v ^ncernina a large tax pax or (hilcrniounlain Power Agene\ s 
residing in the county. 8?3 • ^:da:wM ,'<• •- < \ o^ ini had a iontractual right with -• e 
Tax Commission to review M - taxrecorc. . •• ^ 
CounU •' ' •, '• ' , •, r V/? 815 i'.^ vt ii/~<51175 
(Utah 1991)). Millard County also had a statutory right under Utah's Local Sales and Use 
Tax to assess an additional "piggy-back" tax on the Utah 'lax Commission's sales Lax Id, 
1J7"\ tiled a petition with the I a\ Coiinni.^iim h > n dek miim- IN t is Inhihtv I1 lillhnl 
('i'lintv sough111 ,l|(| intervene and the Tax Commission denied the request. Id. ' rhe denial 
was appealed. ^. 
!he issue before the court was whether a motion lo intervene as of ri^hl is 
appealable after settlement and dismissal \I ai4l)l. A "true" intervenor ofright who has 
met all of the requirements under Rule 24(a)'s mandator)' intervention standard may seek 
to intervene prior to dismissal upon the parties' settlement and may appeal w denial, < M 
1 lie court had 'previously held thai, counties have standine lo challenge determinations by 
the Commission which directly affect the counties5 budgeting and taxing functions." Id. 
17 
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(citing Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985)). The court 
consequently held that Millard County's appeal was not moot. Id. 
Nevertheless, the issue in this case as to whether a settlement between the parties 
(client and its prior counsel), and a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice obviates the 
motion to intervene was not addressed in Millard County. Established precedent 
dictated that Millard County had standing and a statutory right to intervene in that case. 
This is not present here. Appellant has no contractual right to intervene and certainly no 
right to the attorneys' fees claimed by Appellee PADRM. Instead, Appellant is the very 
party Appellees have been suing for well over two years. Appellant has not, and cannot 
cite any authority justifying intervention by a third-party into a case involving an 
attorneys'fee dispute in which it has no privity. 
The only case that counsel has found addressing intervention in an attorney-client 
fee dispute, again, involved a contractual right of the third-party to intervene. Faller v. 
Chevron Corp.y 2008 WL 4831386, *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2004). In Fatter, one of the 
attorneys for the plaintiffs moved to intervene to recover fees the attorney claimed she 
was owed. Id. Similar to this case, "[T]he parties in [Faller] have settled their 
disputes and have jointly moved for an order dismissing all claims with prejudice and 
entering final judgment." Id. After making a detailed analysis of the factual 
circumstances, and in manifesting a preference towards resolution of attorney-client 
disputes, the court denied the motion to intervene. Id. at 5. The court reasoned that there 
was other pending litigation where the claims of the proposed intervenor would be best 
heard and adjudicated. Id. At 4. 
is 
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Similar to the court's decision in Fatter, this is not the proper forum to adjudicate the 
many claims that Appellant is asserting. Those claims and issues are being dealt with 
in the Other Actions. This narrow suit, dealing with attorneys' fees and an attorneys' 
lien, is now settled. As in Fatter, judicial economy and comity weigh heavily in favor of 
the trial court's denial of Appellant's intervention. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE CASE BECAUSE THE ONLY 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING SETTLED THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE, THEREBY 
ELIMINATING ANY JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. 
Appellant relies on Millard for the erroneous conclusion that the trial court 
committed error by dismissing the case upon the merits. As demonstrated above, the 
contractual and statutory rights addressed in Millard are inapplicable to the present 
matter. Furthermore, Millard does not stand for the presumption that a pending motion to 
intervene should automatically permit intervention as suggested by Appellant. A would-
be intervenor must satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a) as did the intervenor in Millard. 
Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in dismissing the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellee PADRM respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the decision of the trial court to grant Appellees' stipulated Motion to Dismiss 
with Prejudice and Upon the Merits. 
10 
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i th DATED this 4m day of November, 2011. 
PIA ANDERSON DOJRIUS RE &MOSS 
fennan H. Moss 
Robert K. Reynard 
Attorneys for Appellee PADRM 
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